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Abstract—Distributed energy resources are able to provide 
services to grid operators, possibly with competing objectives. 
With the development of active distribution grid management, 
various market designs arise. Here, a reference market 
framework is considered, which allocates the available flexibility 
products according to requests coming from both distribution 
and transmission system operators. The goal of this paper is to 
provide an identification procedure that is able to detect, 
identify and catalogue possible conflicts among the involved 
stakeholders that take place when requesting and/or acquiring 
ancillary services from flexible units. The investigation is carried 
out considering a 3-area power system which allows to take into 
account local constraints as well as system-wide needs. As 
outcome, this paper identifies the conflicts from both a 
theoretical and a practical point of view, by means of 
descriptions/identification procedure and by visual examples, 
respectively. 
Index Terms—Ancillary services, Distribution system operator, 
Electric vehicles, Transmission system operator. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing penetration of intermittent distributed 
energy resources (DERs) in modern power systems, the need 
for additional ancillary services is evident, especially for 
balancing purposes. Furthermore, the displacement of 
traditional large power plants due to increased decentralization 
of generation poses challenges to transmission system 
operators (TSOs). In fact, they need to control the power 
system without access to conventional ancillary services from 
a few large power plants. This calls for replacing the 
traditional service providers with aggregated units mostly 
connected to low voltage (LV) grids.  
By contrast, distribution system operators (DSOs) are 
facing technical challenges in accommodating the increasing 
amount of new electrical loads, e.g., electric vehicles (EVs), 
while searching for solutions that defer investment in grid 
reinforcement. 
Since grid balancing is a responsibility of the TSO, 
whereas respecting the local grid constraints needs to be 
assured by the DSO, it is clear that greater cooperation 
between TSOs and DSOs is needed [1], [2]. 
Within this context, if managed properly, EVs become 
flexible resources that can improve the system operation, 
making them an attractive asset for both transmission and 
distribution system operators. In fact, EVs can be considered 
as distributed energy storage systems with large potential for 
network regulation [3], [4]. EVs can be capable of adjusting 
the battery charging process in order to provide different 
ancillary services for supporting the power grid, such as 
primary frequency control or voltage control [5]–[7]. 
It is clear that flexibility provided by EVs can match 
different needs and could potentially create conflicts 
dependent on which stakeholder uses flexibility and for what 
purpose. Flexibility products should be allocated based on 
technical and economic optimization, i.e., flexibility should be 
used where its potential is the highest [8]. Many possible 
market frameworks are proposed in the literature [9]–[13], 
defining roles and responsibilities of the involved stakeholders 
in different situations. In this work, a framework similar to the 
‘Common TSO-DSO Ancillary Service market model’ 
presented within the SmartNet project [13] is introduced. As a 
specific trait, it has a single flexibility platform, which has to 
cope with all the flexibility requests presented by the system 
operators, as well as the flexibility offers received by the 
aggregators.  
The goal of the paper is to propose a catalogue of possible 
TSO/DSO conflicts that can take place when it comes to 
acquiring flexibility products. Furthermore, the work presents 
the logical assessment employed for the identifications of such 
conflicts, with highlighted research questions for future 
investigations. A simplified 3-area power system is taken as a 
reference for the investigation in order to consider both the 
local constraints and the system-wide needs. It is worth 
mentioning that the definition of an internal multi-objective 
optimization algorithm that would be implemented by the 
flexibility platform operator is out of the scope of this work. 
II. EV FLEXIBILITY CHARACTERISTICS AND INVOLVED 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Distributed energy resources are potential providers of 
flexibility services. This Section aims at defining a “flexibility 
product” when providing services either to DSOs or TSO, 
similar to the ancillary services for the TSO. The flexibility 
product can be defined as the power adjustment sustained 
from a particular moment for a certain duration at a specific 
location [10]. Among the various types of DERs, EVs are 
alleged to have special potentials that make them one of the 
most prominent sources of flexibility. Indeed, EVs are 
relatively large loads which are expected to be grid-connected 
and available for long periods of time (high degree of 
flexibility), and claim quick-response (even lower than 0.5 s 
[4]) potentially with bi-directional power flow capabilities 
(V2G) [3]. In this respect, the grid services that they can 
provide are presented in Table I [3].  
TABLE I.  EV GRID SERVICES ADAPTED FROM [3] 
System-wide services 
Name Description 
Primary Frequency 
Regulation 
It keeps the frequency in an interval around 50 Hz 
Secondary Frequency 
Regulation 
It restores the frequency to 50 Hz after deviations 
Tertiary Frequency 
Regulation 
It replaces secondary regulation 
Synthetic Inertia 
It aims at emulating the mechanical inertia of the 
traditional rotating synchronous generators 
Adaptive Charging 
The charging is delayed or advanced in time based 
on, e.g., energy cost or renewable contents 
Distribution grid services 
Name Description 
MV/LV Transformer and 
lines congestion 
management 
It helps to mitigate over-loading of distribution 
transformers and cables 
LV over-/under-voltages 
management 
Massive penetration of small RES units as well as 
EVs could lead to over- or under-voltages 
LV grid phase balancing 
Single-phase EVs could help to mitigate the phase 
unbalances in LV distribution networks 
Islanded microgrid and 
black start 
One or a set of EVs able to sustain a small power 
system could be a valuable resource 
 
The main stakeholders involved in the trading of EV 
flexibility products are listed below [11]: 
TSO - responsible for the transmission system operation 
stability. It needs services, among others, for frequency 
control (from primary to tertiary reserve) and voltage support 
for the transmission grid.  
DSO - responsible for the distribution grid operation and 
thereby for ensuring power delivery to customers at all times, 
without disturbing the transmission system. It needs services, 
among others, for peak-shaving (MV/LV transformer or lines 
congestion management) and local voltage control. 
Balance Responsible Party (BRP) - financially 
responsible for the energy acquired from the power market. 
In case of deviations from the purchased energy, the BRP has 
to pay for imbalances to the TSO, since the TSO is forced to 
activate additional regulation in order to correct the 
imbalances. 
EV owner - willing to offer flexibility to the EV 
aggregator within certain comfort and technical boundaries.  
EV aggregator - collects all the flexibility offers from the 
EV owners of his fleet, makes correspondent contracts with 
them, and bids in the market. Based on individual EV 
capabilities, flexibility products are grouped and offered to 
the market. 
III. TODAY DSO’S ROLE AND PROPOSED MARKET 
FRAMEWORK 
Nowadays, in many European countries the TSO ancillary 
service provision from flexible DER units connected at LV 
levels is already possible. On the other hand, DSOs cannot 
acquire local services from the same DERs, since there is not 
yet a role for DSOs in the market [13]. Therefore, in the 
current market setup, the TSO/DSO conflicts that could take 
place mostly concern the local technical constraints of the 
distribution system infrastructure. In fact, since connected at 
a distribution level, DERs’ adaptive management aimed at 
providing a TSO service may lead to local grid constraints 
violations. In particular, the induced technical issues that the 
DSO is supposed to face would mostly be congestions or 
under/over voltages. A possible mean to reduce these 
conflicts as much as possible is the enhancement of 
TSO/DSO cooperation. This can be achieved by information 
and data exchange in the grid expansion planning phase (long 
term), for congestion management contracts (long/medium 
term), as well as for the real time operation (short term) [8].  
This work assumes a possible future DSO role as an 
active market player. In [14], several key attributes essential 
for the successful operation of future flexible distribution 
systems are identified, along with the possible DSO designs. 
The considered future European DSO model is called 
evolvDSO [15] and is expected to take the following 
responsibilities: network planning and operation processes, 
contracting of flexibility services and market facilitation with 
cooperation between system operators. Within this 
framework, it is clear that – compared to the contemporary 
situation – new issues will arise: not only technical but also 
economical and political when considering remuneration 
schemes and potential conflicts of interests. Thus, in order to 
catalogue such conflicts between TSO and DSOs when 
acquiring flexibility products, the prominent flexibility 
market framework is taken as a benchmark [13]. It includes 
all the listed stakeholders and defines a new day-ahead 
market dynamics in fact such a framework is analyzed with 
respect to the day-ahead trading of EV grid services. As a 
specific trait, it has a single flexibility platform that has to 
cope with all the flexibility requests presented by the system 
operators as well as the flexibility offers received by the 
aggregators. In this way, it is expected that grid constraints 
are implicitly taken into account, since the flexibility operator 
would manage both information about the location of flexible 
sources and the DSOs’ needs for flexibility in different areas. 
The DSOs’ flexibility requests are formulated according to 
the forecasted demand profiles that each DSO receives from 
the suppliers. Moreover, such a platform is supposed to allow 
flexibility procurement without jeopardizing the grid 
operation or creating extra costs [13]. A scheme of the 
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Figure 1. Proposed flexibility market framework for the day-ahead 
trading of EV grid services. (a) and (b) show the interactions among the 
involved stakeholders before and after the clearing process, respectively. 
considered market framework is depicted in Fig. 1. It operates 
in several phases: 
Phase 0 – Before the clearing process: the suppliers 
communicate to the DSOs the forecasted load profiles of their 
customers. EV aggregators contract flexibility with the EV 
owners in their fleets. The TSO trades flexibility through the 
BRP. (Fig. 1-a). 
Phase 1 – Before the clearing process: DSOs and BRP 
present flexibility requests to the Flex Operator according to 
the information received by the suppliers and the TSO, 
respectively. EV aggregators offer flexibility according to the 
contracted aggregated availability from their EV fleets. (Fig. 
1-a). 
Phase 2 – The clearing process: the Flex Operator 
performs an evaluation based on multi-objective optimization 
algorithms that aim at optimally allocating the available 
flexibility products from a technical and economical point of 
view (e.g., respecting the technical needs while minimizing 
the total costs). The evaluation naturally considers that DSOs’ 
local flexibility needs are linked to a particular localized 
congestion problem, whereas the TSO needs flexibility to 
maintain the system stability independently on the location of 
the resource. Eventual conflicts are identified and addressed 
according to the methodology proposed in Section IV. 
Phase 3 – After the clearing process: the Flex Operator 
communicates the obtained optimal flexibility profiles to 
DSOs, BRP and EV aggregators, who will properly manage 
corresponding EV fleets. (Fig. 1-b). 
IV. TSO/DSO CONFLICTS AND PROPOSED METHOD FOR 
IDENTIFICATION 
Different needs for flexibility services of each involved 
stakeholder can raise potential conflicts between two or more 
stakeholders with opposing needs. In fact, the activation of a 
given service could have a negative influence on other 
stakeholders or there could be a limited availability of 
flexibility, thus, only one stakeholder could acquire it. Within 
the market framework proposed in Section II, this kind of 
conflicts will be taken into consideration by the Flex Operator 
platform, which will detect them and then address them 
accordingly. 
The goal of this Section is to provide an identification 
procedure, which is able to detect, identify and catalogue 
possible DSO/TSO conflicts that take place when requesting 
and/or acquiring flexibility products. 
Since the complexity of the problem brings enormous 
amount of different potential conflicts, the here-presented 
analysis focuses on conflicts coming from TSO and DSOs 
flexibility requests for acquiring two specific services, namely 
primary frequency regulation and transformer congestion 
management, respectively. 
Within this context, four conflicts have been identified: 
Conflict (a): Need for compensating imbalances caused by 
activation of flexibility for solving a local distribution issue. 
The need for activating a service to solve a local DSO 
problem in a particular area may cause a problem at a system 
level in terms of balancing. In fact, considering a system in 
balanced operating conditions, a consumption decrease for 
preventing congestion at a distribution level would force the 
BRP to increase the consumption elsewhere. In this way, the 
balance would be guaranteed and the local congestion would 
be prevented. 
Conflict (b): To solve a TSO request, activating the only 
available flexibility product causes distribution overloading. It 
concerns the prioritization problem between DSOs and TSO. 
When activating the only available flexibility to satisfy a TSO 
request would cause distribution overloading. 
Conflict (c): The available flexibility can satisfy either the 
DSO request or the TSO request. It concerns the prioritization 
problem between DSOs and TSO. The offered flexibility 
would not be enough to satisfy all the needs. 
Conflict (d): One flexibility product can solve several 
problems. Rather than a technical conflict, conflict (d) 
presents an economical conflict that the Flex Operator may 
face mainly when remunerating aggregators. In fact, one 
offered asset could have all the necessary capabilities to 
concurrently satisfy both a TSO and a DSO need. Thus, it is 
important to define a fair way to remunerate the aggregator. 
The flow-chart diagram in Fig. 2 shows step by step the 
proposed procedure that the Flex Operator is supposed to 
follow when managing flexibility requests and offers. 
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Figure 4. TSO (a) and DSO (c) flexibility requests over the time, DSO 
forecasted demand (b), and flexibility available in each area (d). 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow-chart of the DSO/TSO conflict detection methodology. 
 
 
Figure 3. 3-area power system. 
First, the Flex Operator receives flexibility requests from 
DSOs and TSO as well as the offers profiles from the 
aggregators. Then, a possible allocation of flexibility over 
time for each location is formulated to accommodate the 
DSOs’ needs. So, the Flex Operator checks whether the new 
power profiles (original DSOs’ demand profiles over time 
with the addition/subtraction of the activated flexibility) would 
introduce problems from a balancing point of view. In this 
case, conflict (a) would be identified, and a new resource 
allocation would need to be obtained. Once a solution that 
does not introduce imbalances is found, the flexibility needs of 
the TSO are considered on top of the already allocated shares 
for the DSOs’ needs. At this point, the methodology proposes 
to check whether with the same flexibility product both DSOs’ 
and TSO’s problems are solved. If yes, the best solution from 
a social point of view would be found, as it would involve the 
least possible amount of flexibility to satisfy all the needs. 
Though, the remuneration conflict (d) would be identified, 
which needs to be addressed while – in parallel – formulating 
the optimal solution. In case conflict (d) is not detected, the 
check on the presence of the other eventual technical conflicts 
(b) or (c) needs to be done. In particular, they concern the 
prioritization problem between DSOs and TSO when the 
offered flexibility is not enough to satisfy all the needs 
(conflict (c)), or in case the activation of the only available 
flexibility would cause distribution overloading (conflict (b)). 
Once one of these two conflicts is detected, an appropriate 
multi-objective optimization algorithm would be necessary to 
find an optimal solution, which will finally be communicated 
to all the involved stakeholders. 
Within the contemporary market situation, it is clear that 
the proposed conflict detection methodology may change. In 
fact, the Flexibility Operator would have to manage requests 
for flexibility coming only from the TSO, so the only possible 
conflict would be conflict (b). Thus, after receiving requests 
and offers, the Flexibility Operator would have to check 
whether problems are caused to DSO. If yes, then conflict (b) 
would be detected, and the optimal solution would be decided 
by the prioritization agreement and finally communicated to 
the involved stakeholders. 
V. TSO/DSO CONFLICT IDENTIFICATION EXAMPLES 
The proposed analysis is based on the investigation of 
possible dynamics in which the listed conflicts could take 
place. The investigation is carried out considering the 
simplified 3-area power system shown in Fig. 3. TSO’s 
transmission lines link the DSOs’ areas to each other through 
three transformers (T1, T2 and T3), whose points of common 
coupling are named PCC1, PCC2 and PCC3, respectively.  
As aforementioned, for the sake of simplicity, the analysis 
considers only the need of preventing overloading of T1, T2 
and T3, while all the others DSOs’ technical needs (such as 
line congestion, under/over-voltages, or phase unbalances) are 
neglected. Regarding the TSO needs for ancillary services for 
primary regulation, a certain profile is assumed to be 
requested. Note that the TSO needs reserve, i.e., availability of 
flexible units to solve a problem that could potentially take 
place. On the other hand, for the DSO the flexibility product 
represents a real need for power to solve a concrete forecasted 
congestion problem. 
Potential 
overload solved
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in Area 2 (as the TSO was 
already in balance)
 
 
Figure 5. New profiles for each area: original DSOs demand profiles over 
time with the addition/subtraction of the activated flexibility. Example of 
compensation of activated DSO flexibility, to keep the system balanced.  
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available flex causes 
potential overloading 
conditions
 
 
Figure 6. Example of induced congestion problem to DSO, due to the 
activation of flexibility to provide a service for the TSO. 
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Figure 7. Example of prioritization problem when acquiring the available 
flexibility: it is possible to solve either the DSO (a) or the TSO (b).  
Potential overload solved + 
TSO request satisfied: with 
the same flexibility 
product, 2 problems are 
solved
 
 
Figure 8. Example of satisfaction of needs of both DSO and TSO, by 
exploiting the same flexibility product. 
In order to allow a visualization of the involved 
forecasted/requested/available flexible power sets, a schematic 
representation is given. For each area, bar plots over the time 
represent the amount of flexibility (in this case positive or 
negative active power) that is requested by DSOs and TSO as 
well as the available flexibility offers, as in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4-a shows the TSO request of flexibility over the time, 
here expressed in Time Units of 15 minutes. It can be seen 
that at Time Unit 2, there is a need for up-reserve, which 
would mean power consumption curtailment due to a possible 
excess of generation. Whereas for Time Units 4 and 5 there is 
a need for down-reserve, which would mean total power 
consumption increase. In case of Time Units 1 and 3 no 
flexibility is requested. Fig. 4-b reports the power demand 
profiles at PCC1, PCC2 and PCC3 forecasted by the DSOs. 
Accordingly, each DSO will formulate correspondent 
flexibility requests to prevent transformer congestion, as 
shown in Fig. 4-c. It can be seen that for T1 no congestion 
situations are forecasted, whereas for T2 and T3, congestions 
are forecasted for Time Unit 3 and 4, and Time Unit 2, 
respectively. An example of possible flexibility offers is 
reported in Fig. 4-d which shows the available flexibility over 
time at the three points of common coupling. 
Herein, examples of each one of the identified conflicts 
that the Flex Operator could face are presented. In particular, 
Fig. 5 to Fig. 8 report the new area-by-area power profiles that 
the Flex Operator obtained following the methodology 
proposed in Section III. Graphically, bar plots show the DSOs 
forecasted demand profiles over time at the three PCCs, with 
the activated flexibility, which is added (orange) or subtracted 
(dashed white) in order to satisfy the requests. 
An example of system imbalances caused by flexibility 
activation for solving a local distribution issue (conflict (a)) is 
schematized in Fig. 5. It can be seen that at Time Unit 3, 
congestion of T2 is solved. Nevertheless, as noticeable from 
Fig. 4-a, the system was already balanced. Therefore, the BRP 
would need to rely on other flexible products located in other 
areas (in this case in area 1), to maintain the system balance. 
Fig. 6 depicts one possible situation which could lead to 
conflict (b), i.e., when solving a TSO request, the activation of 
the only available flexibility causes distribution overloading. It 
can be seen that at PCC1 at Time Unit 5, an overloading 
condition is caused.  
As an example of a possible situation of conflict (c), the 
need for prioritizing a DSO request over the TSO’s and vice 
versa is presented. Fig. 4 shows that at Time Unit 4, the TSO 
needs an increase of the power consumption, while the DSO 
in area 2 requests a power reduction to solve a forecasted 
congestion of T2. Fig. 4-d shows that the available flexibility 
at Time Unit 4 allows to satisfy either the TSO or the DSO 
need. The two possible cases of prioritization to TSO or DSO 
are reported in Fig. 7-a and Fig. 7-b, respectively. 
As said, conflict (d) represents an economical conflict that 
the Flex Operator may face mainly when remunerating 
aggregators. The example reported in Fig. 8 shows that 
congestion of T3 is solved, while at the same time this power 
reduction can also satisfy the TSO need for frequency up-
regulation at Time Unit 2, as deducible from Fig. 4-a. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
This paper identified the TSO/DSO conflicts when 
acquiring flexibility from EVs both in the case of the actual 
typical European DSO design and in case of the newly 
proposed European DSO model evolvDSO. Assuming an 
active DSO market role in managing distribution grids by 
relying on flexible resources, it is clear that new technical and 
economical conflicts may appear. Here, the potential conflicts 
have been defined, described and visually presented from both 
a theoretical and a practical point of view with a proposal of 
respective conflict identification procedure. 
Within the considered market framework, day-ahead 
trading process of ancillary services provided by EVs is 
analyzed. The investigation focused on the potential conflicts 
arising when acquiring services for component (e.g., 
transformer) congestion management and primary frequency 
regulation. The following conflicts have been identified: 
(a) Need for compensating imbalances caused by 
activation of flexibility for solving a local distribution issue 
(b) To solve a TSO request, activating  the only available 
flexibility product causes distribution overloading 
(c) The available flexibility can satisfy either the DSO 
request or the TSO request 
(d) One flexibility product can solve several problems. 
Considering a 3-area power system, each of the analyzed 
conflicts was presented through appropriate case studies that 
allowed to visually appreciating the nature of the conflict. 
The authors point out that, within the considered example 
and time units of 15 minutes, the distribution grid needs would 
need to be prioritized over the TSO’s. In fact, as a larger, more 
flexible and more controllable system, the transmission system 
would be able to rely on more traditional sources for reserve, 
possibly most of the time. In this way, in case the acquirement 
of a flexibility product for a TSO service would potentially 
cause congestion problems to the DSO, the TSO would be 
invited to procure reserve relying on alternative sources. On 
the other hand, in case of frequency dynamics (i.e., within the 
intraday market) the TSO’s needs may have to be prioritized 
over the DSOs’. 
In conclusion, the authors recognize that each one of the 
identified conflicts raises debates, whose resolutions are out of 
the scope of this work, but are expected to cover a broad 
interest within the scientific power engineering community. 
Thus, as a final remark, the following open questions are 
proposed for future works: 
 When the activation of a DSO service causes system 
imbalance, the BRP needs to provide compensation in 
order to maintain the balance. Is the BRP compensated 
for this? If yes, by whom? 
 When the activation of a flexibility product would cause 
problems to another stakeholder, or in case of limited 
availability of flexibility, how does the Flex Operator 
proceed? Who would be prioritized and why?  
 In case one asset has the capabilities to satisfy at the same 
time both a TSO and a DSO need, will the aggregator be 
remunerated twice? If not, which service will it be 
remunerated for? Is it realistic to expect the same price 
although the required performances could be different? 
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